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The Honduran Question: The U.S. 
Answer to Latin America 
Lindsay Young*
ABSTRACT 
Honduras grabbed international headlines when the Honduran Military 
removed José Manuel Zelaya Rosales from power on June 28, 2009.  This 
paper uses the instability in Honduras as a case study of how the United 
States should respond to threats to democracy, and approach questions of 
democratic legitimacy in Latin America.  It will first evaluate democratic 
contentions to put the Honduran crisis into a broader historical context.  
Next, it will examine the legality of the actions that triggered the democratic 
crisis because, though legality is not sufficient for legitimacy, it should be an 
important consideration in determining foreign policy responses.  It will 
discuss the choices that the United States had between the removal of 
President Zelaya and the election of his successor, and analyze the path that 
the United States ultimately chose by supporting the reinstatement of 
President Zelaya, until it was clear that the reinstatement would not occur, at 
which point it decided to support the November election. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Latin America presents a distinct challenge to U.S. foreign policy.  The 
region is highly democratic, but many of the countries have not consolidated 
their democracies.  In the fall of 2009, the turmoil in Honduras was 
President Obama’s first test on how to approach the development of 
democracy in Latin America and illustrates the concerns regarding the 
internal struggles of democracy and the limited options that the U.S. has in 
another country’s internal affairs.  This paper uses the instability in 
Honduras as a case study of how the United States should respond to threats 
to democracy in Latin America and approach the question of democratic 
legitimacy in Latin America. 
* Lindsay Young (M.P.P. 2010) graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in history from the 
University of California Riverside.  At Pepperdine, she specialized in American Politics and 
International Relations.  During her time at Pepperdine, Lindsay enjoyed being Symposium Editor of 
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Public Policy.  This paper was presented at the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies 
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The Honduran military removed President Zelaya from power on June 
28, 2009 because of President Zelaya’s attempts to pursue a national 
referendum that would allow presidential reelection.  The Honduran 
Constitution allows for a presidential veto or decree to alter the Honduran 
Constitution except in cases that relate to the “conduct of the executive 
branch.”  A national vote initiated by the president may sound democratic, 
but the single term provision in the constitution remedied the political 
structure that had led to years of military dictatorship. 
The legislative and the judicial branches of Honduras see President 
Zelaya’s dismissal as an act to safeguard democracy because Article 239 of 
the Honduran Constitution states that if someone tries to extend term limits, 
that person is to be immediately removed and disqualified from holding 
executive office for ten years.1  President Zelaya tried to work around this 
restriction by framing his referendum in terms of a broad constitutional 
reform, but his policies limited democracy by expanding the power of the 
executive, and ultimately followed the trajectory of Hugo Chávez.2
After President Zelaya’s seizure and deportation, Honduras scheduled 
an emergency election for November 29, 2009, and the opposition candidate, 
Porfirio Lobo, won the election.  Prior to the election, the U.S. did not 
support President Zelaya’s removal, but the U.S. is now supporting the 2009 
election in an effort to promote national reconciliation and democracy.3  
President Zelaya is still living in exile as a civilian in the Dominican 
Republic.4  The U.S. is suffering moderate political backlash because not all 
countries are recognizing the election as legitimate.5  For example, countries 
such as Brazil are considering this move tantamount to supporting a coup.6  
In addition, Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that publishes 
an annual ranking of countries based on their relative levels of democratic 
freedom, has relegated Honduras’s status and no longer classifies Honduras 
as an electoral democracy.7
The U.S. response to the removal of President Zelaya sets a precedent 
for democracy and stability in the region.  With this in mind, the U.S. had to 
evaluate its options and ascertain which choice will best promote democracy 
and stability, and minimize the political consequences to the U.S.  In the 
case of Honduras, the U.S. could have supported, ignored, or denounced the 
removal of President Zelaya, since the use of force would have been 
inappropriate.  The U.S. made the right choice by moderately supporting 
President Zelaya’s reinstatement, and then accepting the results of the next 
election as legitimate.8  Ultimately, the U.S. should choose to recognize free 
and fair elections in the case of Honduras or any Latin American country 
that might be in a similar situation in the future because the U.S. must 
demonstrate strong support for democracy to assist in Latin America’s 
struggle to overcome history. 
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II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The first step to evaluating the U.S.’s policy response in Honduras is to 
put the crisis into a broader historical context.  In the case of Honduras, it 
declared independence from Spain on September 15, 1821.9  The 
government began as a series of caudillos, political factions, and the military 
evolved from arming these political factions.10  Tiburcio Carías Andino, 
who ruled from 1933 to 1948, created the first professionalized army, but it 
was not until 1954, that Juan Manuel Galvez strengthened the military 
relationship between the U.S. and Honduras.11  In 1954, the Honduran 
Congress prevented the democratically elected president from assuming 
power and Vice-President Julio Lozano took control.12
When the civilian government tried to limit the power of the military 
that had been entrenched in Honduran institutions by earlier military control, 
there was a military coup.13  From 1963–1971, General Oswaldo López 
Arellano ruled Honduras, however, his government’s credibility diminished 
when it lost a border dispute with El Salvador.14  Consequently, a weak 
civilian government briefly took control before López seized power again.15
In 1975 the military seized power from Lopez and gave control to the 
more militaristic control by Colonel Juan Melgar.16  Colonel Policarpo Paz 
García then deposed Melagar in 1978.  Paz Garcia promised to return the 
country to civilian rule, though he remained as president of the interim 
government created following the election of a new assembly government.17  
The military retained considerable control over civilian government until 
1982, when democracy was restored under Roberto Suazo Córdova.18  
Under the “protected democracy” of the 1980s, the military retained 
considerable power and benefited from U.S. military aid in response to the 
Contras of El Salvador.19  The U.S. established bases to train and deploy 
Contras against the Sandinista government.20
Following the Cold War, the U.S. became critical of the Honduran 
military and cut military aid and Honduras now ranks 154th in percent of 
GDP used for military forces.21  In addition, the International Court of 
Justice ended the border dispute between Honduras and El Salvador.22  The 
Honduran people, sick of corruption and the economic burden of the 
military, created a movement to demilitarize the government and society 
through major military cutbacks.23  Civilian leaders have greater control of 
the government, but it is nevertheless still important to consider how 
frequently military control has usurped civilian control in recent history.  
Understanding the repeated intervention of the military and the U.S. support 
for Honduras’ military dictatorships of the past brings to light why the U.S. 
response to military involvement in President Zelaya’s removal is important. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Interpreting the legality of any democratic crisis can provide insight in 
to what kind of predicament the country is in.  If those in power have clearly 
acted illegally, it would be hard to imagine a scenario where these actors 
acted in the interest of democracy.  On the other hand, there may be legal 
ways to subjugate democracy and such actions should not be encouraged.  
Legality is not sufficient for legitimacy, but it should be an important 
consideration in determining which actions the U.S. should support, ignore, 
or sanction. 
The Honduran Constitution, which has been continuously revised, is the 
source of confusion in defining the legality of the Honduran action to 
remove President Zelaya.  The Honduran Constitution’s impeachment clause 
was removed by decree.24  In addition, while the Honduran Constitution 
allows for charges to be filed against high officials, it lacks a provision 
explaining the procedure of removal.25  Even when there are relevant 
provisions, there are disagreements about their interpretation.26  The main 
points of contention are whether the Honduran government could still pursue 
impeachment after the clause had been taken out by decree, whether the 
Supreme Court has the authority to try the President’s removal, whether the 
Supreme Court could use the military to remove President Zelaya, whether 
the military acted in accordance with the warrant issued by the Supreme 
Court under the Honduran Constitution, and whether such violations would 
make the entire action unconstitutional.27
Because the impeachment clause, Article 205, Section 15,  was repealed 
in 2003 by Decree 157/2003, the procedure of impeachment by the 
legislature was also repealed.28  President Zelaya’s removal was based on 
the Supreme Court’s ability to try high officials in Article 313, Section 2, 
which was established in the same year in Decree 175/2003.29  Because both 
provisions were decreed in the same year, one can conclude the intent of the 
decrees was to replace the legislative impeachment clause with judicial 
action.  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s trial of President Zelaya seems to 
comply with constitutional requirements.  In rulings made on May 27, 2009 
and May 29, 2009, the Supreme Court declared that the president could not 
change the constitutional provision against reelection by a referendum, a 
poll, or any other method that violates the clauses prohibiting reelection in 
Article 218, Section 9.30  Therefore, President Zelaya’s trial produced a clear 
prohibition against the President’s actions to alter the Honduran Constitution 
to make him eligible for reelection. 
However, the trial presents complications because there is no provision 
in the constitution explaining how the trial procedure works and specifically, 
there are no provisions that outline the role of the military or police forces in 
enforcing the court’s ruling.  It was not the decision to remove President 
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Zelaya that caused the most uproar but rather, the means of removal that 
garnered the greatest objections.  The involvement of armed forces in 
President Zelaya’s removal caused the most controversy, second only to the 
outcry against President Roberto Micheletti’s decree that suspended human 
rights.31  The Supreme Court holds the authority to apply and enforce laws 
under Article 304 of the Honduran Constitution and furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has the authority to request the public forces to enforce 
rulings as listed in Article 306.32  For this reason, the Supreme Court 
appears to have acted constitutionally when it issued the warrant compelling 
the armed forces to remove President Zelaya. 
After President Zelaya’s removal, the Honduran Congress followed 
proper procedure in presidential succession because the Vice President had 
already resigned.33  Therefore, the removal of President Zelaya from office 
and the appointment of his replacement, President Micheletti, seem to be 
within constitutional bounds.  The first clear constitutional violation 
occurred when the military deported President Zelaya from Honduras.  This 
violated the ban on extraditing Hondurans to foreign states, which is in 
Article 102 of the Honduran Constitution.34  While that action may be 
illegal, the powers of constitutional interpretation lie with the Supreme Court 
and perhaps, the Legislature.35  Neither branch would declare that the action 
of the military tainted the removal process, and the Supreme Court tried and 
acquitted six generals.36
There are critics that contend that the legislature does not have the right 
to interpret the Honduran Constitution and that the forged resignation letter 
produced in the legislature is proof of greater wrongdoing by Congress.  
However, the Supreme Court has the ability to rule on constitutional issues 
and enforce its decisions.  Understanding the legal analysis of the situation is 
important because it helps uncover the dynamics of the situation.  In this 
case, the legality of the President’s removal is questionable, but not 
flagrantly illegal.  Therefore, the U.S. could support the presidential trial, but 
only tenuously. 
IV.  U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
Immediately following the removal of President Zelaya, the U.S. needed 
to decide if it would support, denounce, or ignore the removal of President 
Zelaya.  Any course of action must encourage stability and promote 
democracy in Latin America with the least political cost to the United States.  
Stability and democracy are factors that contribute to peace and consistency 
in government and therefore, can encourage future prosperity.  To achieve 
these goals, the U.S. could have used force to denounce the military’s 
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actions, diplomatically denounced the military’s actions, moderately 
supported the removal, ignored the situation until the next election, or 
supported the reinstatement of Zelaya.  There will never be a perfect 
solution, but projecting the costs and rewards of possible actions can help 
produce the best available policy in any scenario. 
One of the boldest moves would have been to use military actions 
covertly or openly.  This was not a viable option because the history of U.S. 
intervention in Latin America has left much to be desired.  The covert 
actions during the Cold War caused chaos, bloodshed, torture, and damaged 
the credibility of the United States in Latin America.37  Moreover, it would 
be illogical to forcibly reinstate a less than democratic leader with anti-U.S. 
tendencies.  Military intervention would be exceedingly unpopular in U.S. 
domestic politics and would promote instability in the region with great 
political costs to the U.S.  Therefore, this choice was not considered. 
The use of policy levers, such as pressure from the international 
community, is more efficient and bears less political and financial costs.  
With a relatively small investment, trade and aid incentives can also 
influence the behavior of sovereign nations.  If the U.S. wants to influence 
the outcome in Honduras, a measured approach of these moderate policy 
tools would be most appropriate.  The main issue is whether the U.S. should 
apply such pressures, and if so, toward what purpose they should be applied. 
It may have been justifiable to use policy tools to back the Honduran 
government’s exile of President Zelaya because he was engaging in activity, 
the Honduran Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional, to further his 
ambitions of a prolonged tenure in office.  The government attempted to 
follow the proper procedures in addressing President Zelaya’s abuses, but 
President Zelaya’s ousting posed the main problem.  Layers of decrees 
changed the Honduran Constitution and muddled the removal process.  
Decrees removed the institutional framework for punishing the misbehavior 
of officials and replaced it with vague oversight from the legislature and the 
Supreme Court.  It can be argued that the removal was constitutional 
considering Article 239 says that if an executive official proposes extension 
of the presidential term, that act disqualifies the person from presidential 
service for ten years.38
Taking into account the historical context, the support of what many 
consider a coup would be a difficult political position to defend because 
“many in Latin America saw Mr. Zelaya’s arrest in his pajamas as an 
unacceptable throwback to the region’s dark past.”39  The U.S. has decades 
of experience backing military dictators and propping up oppressive leaders 
with military aid, but siding with the leaders that ousted a democratically 
elected president is typically an antidemocratic act.  In the future, the U.S. 
may lose credibility when it professes to support democracies because 
supporting the removal of a president could encourage other governments to 
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remove their presidents instead of working within the normal democratic 
processes.  In addition, support of President Zelaya’s removal would have 
signaled a U.S. tolerance for coups that could embolden those planning 
future coups and the U.S. did not want to encourage instability that might 
spill over into neighboring countries.  The U.S. also benefits from having a 
consistent pro-democratic policy because a consistent policy helps to 
achieve long-term stability.  Unfortunately, there was no clear consensus 
about which policy choice was the most pro-democratic and the U.S. could 
have incurred great political costs.  In addition, supporting President 
Zelaya’s removal could have had a destabilizing effect without clear gains 
for democracy. 
Another possible option would have been for the U.S. to ignore 
President Zelaya’s removal and wait for the event to run its course.  The next 
presidential election was scheduled for November 29, 2009.  If no action 
takes place, the most likely result would be that citizens would elect a new 
president and democracy would resume in the country.  This seems to be 
what happened.  Not reinstating President Zelaya had distinct advantages for 
Honduras and the U.S.  If President Zelaya remained out of office, he did not 
have the opportunity to engage in acts reminiscent of Hugo Chávez that may 
have undermined democracy.  Reinstating President Zelaya might have 
encouraged him and given him the opportunity to increase his power and 
entrench his position.  This would have had negative consequences for 
democracy in Honduras.  In addition, his anti-American perspective could 
have caused the U.S. more difficulty in foreign relations.  Therefore, not 
taking a position concerning President Zelaya’s removal might have had 
fewer political costs for the United States than taking a stand against his 
reinstatement. 
Remaining neutral on the issue benefited the current Honduran 
government and the U.S. could have used this as a bargaining chip to 
encourage constitutional reform.  Although, a U.S. push for constitutional 
reform may have been problematic and perceived as meddling.  
Nevertheless, the constitutional ambiguity leads to problems.  This 
ambiguity has been exacerbated by the fact that the use of decrees has 
resulted in 130 changes to the Honduran Constitution since 1982.40  In 
addition, much of the Honduran Constitution contains what would be 
statutory law in the U.S. because it outlines numerous rights, including labor 
and children’s rights.41  The large number of decrees, altering the Honduran 
Constitution, caused the current chaos surrounding President Zelaya’s 
removal because one of the decrees altered the impeachment process, which 
removed procedural certainty. 
 10 
Restoring impeachment proceedings and reducing the number of 
decrees that change the Honduran Constitution could have a long-term 
benefit by addressing the root cause of the problem.  While some flexibility 
is necessary, Honduras may benefit from the stability of a constitution that is 
harder to change.  The unicameral legislature requires a higher vote 
threshold to prevent repeated constitutional change because getting one 
legislative body to agree is often easier than convincing two legislative 
bodies that constitutional change is necessary.  A three-fourths vote to pass a 
referendum to change the constitution would be harder to achieve than the 
two-thirds vote that is currently required under Article 5 of the Honduran 
Constitution.42. 
The U.S. cannot directly control this domestic issue, but it can use 
indirect means to suggest changes that may help Honduras, or other 
countries in similar circumstances, consolidate its democracy.  Incentives 
such as not putting pressure on talks to reinstate President Zelaya could 
persuade the legislators to consider reform.  However, such a large change 
may not be possible while the country is under stress and the fix would have 
to come from a negotiated political process.  In a political arena with many 
actors, it would be harder for the U.S. to suggest reforms that the legislature 
could implement in a timely manner.  In addition, this policy has the least 
certain effects because the adoption of reforms will ultimately be out of the 
U.S.’s hands, and therefore, the prospect of democracy under this plan 
would have been questionable.  There also could have been some negative 
effects to the region’s stability because other potential coup leaders may 
have become emboldened and the U.S. may have lost credibility for 
contradicting President Obama’s support for democracy, since because both 
sides in Honduras see their cause as democratic. 
The initial U.S. policy was to promote the reinstatement of President 
Zelaya.  One of the first moves by the U.S. State Department was to cutoff 
assistance to the Honduran government and define the removal of President 
Zelaya as a coup.43  The U.S. State Department looked to President Arias of 
Costa Rica to mediate the dispute within Honduras. 44  The goal was to 
restore President Zelaya until the end of his term, and then he would not be 
eligible for reelection under the Honduran Constitution.45  President Arias 
warned that the international community would not recognize the November 
2009 election if President Zelaya was not restored before the election.  
President Arias explains that reinstating President Zelaya, even with limited 
powers, will provide “assurance of the continuity of democracy in Latin 
America [and that t]he cost of failure of leaving a coup d’état unpunished is 
setting up a bad precedent for the region.”46  When taking Honduras’ 
militaristic past into account, one can see how restoring the democratically 
elected president could foster faith in democracy.  Yet, there is a small 
chance that if President Zelaya was reinstated he could have commandeered 
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the government, and then democracy and stability would have been in a 
much worse situation.  The Arias Plan tried to prevent this worse case 
scenario by restoring President Zelaya with limited powers. 
If the U.S. had supported the Arias Plan, it would have shown that the 
U.S. had a sincere commitment to the restoration of President Zelaya, and 
that the U.S. was not pretending to admonish President Micheletti, while 
benefitting from ignoring the situation.  The most problematic part of the 
Arias Plan is that it recommended not accepting the results of the November 
2009 election without reinstating President Zelaya.  This would have put 
considerable pressure on the Honduran government to reinstate President 
Zelaya.  The Arias Plan had a potential risk because if negotiations did not 
lead to the reinstatement of President Zelaya, the consequences of not 
recognizing the election could have led to a longer period of instability.  
Over the next presidential term, the democratic process could have lost 
legitimacy, even though a fair and free election took place, and therefore this 
provision of the plan could have damaged democracy and stability in the 
region. 
The leaders of Latin America may be better judges of what promotes 
stability for their countries.  The current Costa Rican President promoted the 
return of President Zelaya, and Brazil supported President Zelaya by taking 
him in to its embassy.47  Furthermore, Latin America saw the reinstatement 
of President Zelaya as fulfilling its own interests of stability and democracy.  
Overall, recommending the reinstatement of President Zelaya would have 
had a relatively small political cost to the U.S. because of the support for this 
policy from Latin American countries.  The countries in the region promoted 
reinstatement as the most stable choice because it might have prevented 
future coups.  There would also have been some democratic gains by 
minimizing the role of the military in civilian government operations, even if 
it is at the bequest of the Supreme Court. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
After exploring the various policy options, it is clear that if the U.S. had 
supported the removal of the Honduran President, it would have been 
politically costly, may have had negative effects on democracy in Latin 
America, and may have reduced stability in the region by encouraging future 
coups.  Remaining neutral to the situation would have cost the U.S. political 
credibility, and have the same ill effects on stability and democracy as 
supporting the removal of the president.  Supporting the reinstatement of 
President Zelaya could have moderate gains for democracy, increased 
regional stability by discouraging coups, and had the least political costs.  
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Yet, the Arias Plan did the entail risk that may have resulted in the worst 
possible scenario, the unlawful seizure of the government by President 
Zelaya, especially if concrete limits were not placed on President Zelaya. 
Out of these possible options, the U.S. chose not to recognize the 
removal of the President Zelaya, in order to deter future coup leaders.  
However, after the election, the U.S. recognized the new democratically 
elected president.  The U.S. made the right choice supporting the Arias Plan 
with the proviso that if the elections were free and fair the U.S. would 
recognize their results.  This policy has avoided the long-term risks of the 
Arias Plan and it has the greatest potential to produce the most gains for 
regional democracy and stability with tolerable political costs to the U.S.  In 
addition, the recognition of free and fair elections makes sense and sends a 
consistent pro-democratic message. 
While the U.S. may have taken the most attractive option, there are still 
serious implications.  Opposition candidate, Porfirio Lobo, won the election 
on November 27, 2009 and the U.S. supported the results in an effort to 
promote national reconciliation. 48  But, not all states are recognizing the 
election as legitimate, and some countries, such as Brazil, are considering 
this move tantamount to supporting the coup. 49  In addition, Freedom House 
has relegated Honduras’s status and no longer classifies Honduras as an 
electoral democracy. 50  As a result the U.S. has suffered moderate political 
backlash.  Although these political costs have been mitigated since other 
Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica, have 
decided to accept the election results.51
The institutions in Honduras have survived and it may be possible to 
repair the damage to democracy caused by the removal of Zelaya.  The Lobo 
administration has a significant challenge ahead.  Honduras must act with 
clearly defined and democratic actions to regain international legitimacy.  
The best way to accomplish this is for the executive, legislature, and the 
people to reexamine their constitution.  Much could be gained from 
clarifying the duties of the different branches of government, the 
enforcement powers, and most importantly, the constitutional procedures. 
The goal of the U.S. foreign policy towards Honduras, and other Latin 
American countries, should be to foster democracy and stability while 
avoiding political costs that would erode the U.S.’s soft power in the region.  
The U.S. made the right choice in Honduras by trying to reconcile factions, 
while ultimately showing support for the result of the next election.  Military 
actions would be counterproductive in almost any Latin American country 
because of the region’s history with military oppression.  The United States 
must demonstrate strong support to democracy to assist in Latin America’s 
struggle to overcome history.  Ultimately, the instability in Honduras sets a 
precedent that shows the most beneficial U.S. response to questions of 
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democratic legitimacy in Latin American countries is the consistent 
recognition of free and fair elections. 
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